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Abstract 
Due to the huge market potentiality, profuse production resource such as workforce and land, and low 
production costs in China, many international high-tech enterprises are moving their production line 
to China. Accompanying production offshoring is the transfer of Information Technology (IT) to 
ensure that the production processes remain efficient and effective at home and abroad. Many 
enterprises however encounter problems in transferring their IT to China, especially when the IT is an 
inter-organizational system (IOS), which is across organizational boundaries and involves the 
management of relationships among participants. In order to understand how to successfully transfer 
IOS to China, we aim to find out key relational factors of IOS performance in China through an 
observation of a binary relationship built upon an e-procurement system between a Taiwanese PC 
ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) and its Chinese suppliers. Based on the relational view of the 
firm, four relational factors are proposed and examined. The results show that IOS specific 
investments and effective IOS governance most strongly affects the result of IOS transfer to China, 
whereas complementary resource endowment has least influence. 
Keywords: Relational view, Inter-organizational systems, IT transfer, China. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the huge market potentiality, profuse production resource such as workforce and land, and low 
production costs in China, many international high-tech enterprises are moving their production line to 
China. They create a broad and deep supply chain within China that produces many of the parts and 
components the high-tech industry uses. This shift makes China the world’s major high-tech product 
manufacturing center. As China science and technology newsletter reveals, China’s import and export 
volume of high tech products hits an amount of USD 415.96 billion in 2005, with an increase of 
27.2% compared with the preceding year (Feb. 28, 2006).  
Accompanying production offshoring has been the relocation of business processes and tasks from 
home country to China. While these shifts are disruptive, they usually create demands for the transfer 
of Information Technology (IT) to ensure that the production processes remain efficient and effective 
at home and abroad. However, many enterprises encounter problems in transferring their information 
systems to China. The lower level of IT maturity in China may be one of the reasons. According to the 
World Economic Forum (December 2003), China’s combined ability to produce, develop, and utilize 
information technology ranked forty-third in 2002, but dropped to fifty-first in 2003. Furthermore, the 
levels of technology development are different among areas or provinces, and the growing rate of 
network can’t fit the demand of fast growing population.  
Besides immature information infrastructure, barriers can also come from business, legal and cultural 
perspectives (Tan and Wu 2004, Wang 2002). For example, Tan and Wu (2004) find firms in China 
consider the “privacy of data and security issues” and “inadequate legal protection for Internet 
purchases” as the top two obstacles to e-commerce diffusion. Mao and Palvia (2006) demonstrate that 
behavioral beliefs in usefulness, compatibility, visibility, and result demonstrability highly influence 
the formation of attitude to IT acceptance in China. In addition, Hsieh et al. (2006) declare that 
Chinese firms’ information orientation, which is the deeply rooted set of value and beliefs regarding 
information acquisition and dissimilation, is positively related to e-business adoption. Xu et al. (2004) 
investigate organizational adoption of e-business in the United State and China and find four major 
differences. First, technology competence of China firms is more critical to e-business adoption than 
of United States firms. Second, opposition to United States, resource advantages come with large firm 
size seem to moderate the negative effect of structural inertia. The larger a firm size, the higher 
possibility to adopt e-business in China. Third, in the aspect of global scope, increased complexity 
associated with greater scope tend to inhibit e-business adoption in China. At last, government 
regulation plays a more critical role in China than in United States.  
The above studies emphasize that the transfer of IT to China can be complex. We can expect that more 
complicated issues arise when the IT is an inter-organizational system (IOS), which is across 
organizational boundaries and involves the management of relationships among participants. 
Additional risks and conflicts may incur during the IOS transfer such as problems of responsibility, 
coordination, sharing of costs and benefits, and concerns about competitive position (Kumar and Van 
Dissel 1996). For example, some researchers have noticed that IOS performance in China is affected 
by a particular type of buyer-supplier relationships called ‘guanxi’, which is the pronunciation of 
relationship in Chinese and refers to a system of personal connections that carry long-term social 
obligations (Lu and Bjorkman 1997). It is interesting, then, that the major issues concerning the 
transfer of IOS to China should include not only the legal, cultural, technical, and behavioral 
differences, but also the change of buyer-supplier relationships. IOS performance can be generated 
through the investment of inter-organizational relations such as decision and operation integration, 
mutual investment in relation-specific assets, and information sharing (Lee 2000, Kim and Umanath 
2005, Wang et al. 2006). When IOS transfers to China, all these previous relationship investments are 
missing and need to re-make, adding the difficulties to retain IOS performance. It is this challenge 
which is addressed here. That is, what are the important relationship-associated factors that affect IOS 
success in the context of China?  
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how problems may arise when global enterprises in China 
neglect the investment of relational assets during the IOS transfer process. We propose a model based 
upon relational view literature and develop propositions regarding relational investments that can 
foster the transfer of IOS to China. The experiences of a high-tech multi-national enterprise attempting 
to transfer its e-procurement system to China are then examined. We find that the performance of this 
system in China is relatively unsatisfactory comparing with in Taiwan and western countries. The 
enterprise receives grant complaints from Chinese users. Although there are significant top 
management support and great user participation, factors that foster IOS relationship such as inter-firm 
knowledge sharing activities are not provided. Insight from this model and the case can help managers 
and researchers: (1) identify important relational factors in IOS transfer process and (2) determine 
which relational factor is relatively important to Chinese users so that a more effective IOS transfer 
process can be planned and executed.   
2 RESEARCH MODEL 
Built upon relational view of the firm, our research model identifies IOS-specific relational factors and 
examines their influence on IOS transfer process in the context of China. It is employed later in 
interpreting the case. 
2.1 Relational View of the Firm 
The relational view of the firm posits that a firm’s critical resources and capabilities may extend 
beyond organizational boundaries and may be embedded in inter-firm resources and processes. Dyer 
and Singh (1996) identify four relational resources of inter-organiazational competitive advantage: (1) 
relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge sharing routines, (3) complementary resources, and (3) 
effective governance. Relation-specific assets include tangible and intangible assets specialized in 
conjunction with the assets of partners. Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) classify such assets into 
two dimensions: tangible assets specificity and intangible assets specificity. The former includes site 
specificity and physical asset specificity, and the latter can be conceptualized in terms of business 
process specificity and domain knowledge specificity. Inter-firm Knowledge-Sharing Routines refer to 
a regular pattern of inter-firm interactions that permits the transfer, recombination, or creation of 
specialized knowledge (Grant 1996). These are institutionalized inter-firm processes designed to 
facilitate knowledge exchange between partners. Complementary resource endowments are distinctive 
resources of trading partners that collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained 
from the individual endowments of each partner. These complementary strategic resources increase 
with the degree of compatibility in their organizational systems, processes, and cultures (Dyer and 
Singh 1998). An effective governance structure can minimize transaction costs, thereby enhancing 
efficiency (Williamson, 1985, North, 1990, Dyer and Singh, 1998). It includes third-party enforcement 
of agreements and self-enforcing agreements.  
We use Dyer and Singh’s classification scheme as the basis to identify four key IOS-related relational 
resources: (1) IOS-specific investments comprising the tangible and intangible asset specificity, (2) 
IOS knowledge sharing routines comprising dedicated IOS knowledge sharing activities and partner-
specific absorptive capacity, (3) IOS complementary resources comprising strategic and organizational 
complementary resources, and (4) IOS governance, including the mechanisms for IOS performance 
and risk management. The research model is shown in Figure 1. The following discussions describe 
the research model and provide propositions that are later employed to help understand the IOS 
transfer process in the context of China.  
2.2 IOS-Specific Investments 
IOS-specific investment refers to the assets that are specialized in conjunction with the assets of an 
IOS partner. It is classified into two types: tangible assets specificity and intangible assets specificity. 
Tangible assets are defined as specialized hardware/software or dedicated people that are 
advantageous in working with a specific IOS partner (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003). In China, 
tangible assets specificity is often shown in the form of joint IOS development teams. According to a 
case study of Cisco and Xiao Tong in China by Lu et al. (2006), the cross-organizational 
implementation team is one of critical success factors of IOS. Intangible assets specificity can be 
further divided into business process specificity and domain knowledge specificity (Subramani and 
Venkatraman 2003). Business process specificity refers to the degree to which critical business 
processes are changed by one firm to meet the requirements of an IOS. Domain knowledge specificity 
refers to the degree to which critical knowledge of a firm is specific to the requirements of an IOS. 
The critical knowledge includes the understanding of partners, like partner’s competitive analysis, 
strategy formulation, products conception, and so on. According to Lu et al. (2006), inter-
organizational business process re-engineering (BPR) plays an important part for IOS success in 
China. In their case study, the inter-organization BPR in China includes two parts. The first one is the 
adjustment of processes. Non-value-added parts of business processes are erased after the 
implementation of IOS. The second part is the formulation of new inter-firm cooperation. Both the 
focal firm and the partners alter their processes and redefine their duties and responsibilities to ensure 
the smooth operation of IOS. The following proposition is set forth: 
Proposition 1 The success of transferring IOS to China can be affected by the investment of (1) 
tangible IOS assets and (2) intangible IOS assets. 
 
Figure 1.  Factors affecting the transfer of IOS to China 
2.3 IOS Knowledge Sharing Routines 
IOS knowledge sharing routines are defined as regular patterns of inter-firm interactions that permit 




























There are two key components of IOS knowledge-sharing routines: dedicated IOS knowledge sharing 
activities and partner-specific absorptive capacity. Dedicated IOS knowledge sharing activities are 
those that make firms successful in capturing, integrating, and disseminating IOS-management know-
how such as technology forums, workshops, and seminars (Dyer et al. 2001). Partner-specific 
absorptive capacity refers to the ability to recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge about the IOS 
from a particular partner (Dyer and Singh 1998). According to Hitt et al (2004), unique capabilities are 
more difficult to learn than complementary capabilities in China because of their exclusivity and a 
lack of absorptive capacity of partnering firms. According to Luo (1997), the absorptive capacity of 
local firms in China is important for the international joint venture’s overall performance and its 
financial returns. These two performance dimensions are found to be an increasing function of the 
local firm’s ability to acquire, assimilate, and integrate the foreign partner’s distinguishing 
technologies or tacit knowledge. A local partner’s high absorptive capabilities to absorb and assimilate 
its counterpart’s tacit knowledge will lead to better overall performance in general and better Return-
on-Investment and local sales in China. The following proposition is set forth: 
Proposition 2 The success of transferring IOS to China can be affected by the existence of (1) 
dedicated IOS knowledge sharing activities and (2) partner-specific absorptive 
capacity. 
2.4 IOS Complementary Resources 
Complementary resource endowment refers to the distinctive resources of IOS partners that 
collectively generate greater advantages than the sum of those obtained from the individual 
endowments. Through combination of these resources within partners will make the IOS more 
powerful and more competitive, and hard to imitate. In this study, complementary resource 
endowment is divided into two components: strategic complementarity and organizational 
compatibility. Strategic complemntarity includes the investment of complementary systems that are 
valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate when combined with the underlying IOS. For instance, Wal-
Mart’s point-of-sales (POS) application is a complementary system with regard to P&G’s 
collaborative planning, fulfillment, and replenishment system (CPFR). When Wal-Mart’s sales 
information conjuncts with supplier’s production information, both parties can adjust their production 
arrangement or stock level immediately and achieve superior competitive advantage that neither 
system can generate alone. Besides strategic complementarity, organizational compatibility is also 
important to the IOS success. We define organizational compatibility as the situation in which the 
culture, process, and internal applications are compatible enough to facilitate coordinated IOS 
operations. According to Hitt et al. (2004), although of more importance to Chinese managers is the 
opportunity to learn new and unique capabilities, Chinese firms still desire partners with 
complementary capabilities that they can leverage. Also, Luo (1997) argues that the selection of 
complementary partners results in improved international joint venture performance as well as cross-
country IT development. The following proposition is set forth: 
Proposition 3 The success of transferring IOS to China can be affected by the existence of (1) 
complimentary strategic resources and (2) compatible organizational resources. 
2.5 IOS Governance 
Using IOS to transact with trading partners may expose firms to a great risk of opportunism or losing 
its important information. It is important to choose a governance structure that minimizes transaction 
costs and transactions risks (e.g. opportunistic behavior or information asymmetry). The effective IOS 
governance mechanisms should include the ability to enforce partners to follow the standards of 
procedures (SOP) determined by top management. In addition to SOP enforcement, the mechanisms 
that support performance and risk management are also preferred. That is, IOS should enable 
companies to share performance information relevant to the relationship, e.g. exchange of 
production/sales data, sharing promotion plans, and so on. It should also enhance companies’ ability to 
monitor and control the partners’ operation information (such as production schedule, or inventory 
levels, etc), performance, and the transactions status (Kim and Umanath, 2005). According to Skin et 
al. (2007), the efficiency of external information sharing in China is significantly affected by Chinese 
guanxi, and thereby an effective IOS governance structure is expected to bring enormous opportunities 
for improving efficiency, flexibility, and timeliness of Chinese supply chain integration. The 
proposition is as follows: 
Proposition 4 The success of transferring IOS to China can be affected by the development of 
governance mechanisms for (1) SOP enforcement, (2) performance management, and (3) risk 
management. 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
This section describes the validity and reliability of the case study method employed. Since the main 
purpose of this case study is to gain insight based on relational view of the firm that provides a greater 
understanding of the problems involved in the transfer of IOS to China, the case is employed to 
illustrate the theory, not to develop or test the theory. Researchers suggest that employing the case in 
such positivist fashion requires attention to construct validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin 
2003).  Note that internal validity is not an issue here.   
According to Yin (2003) and Cooper (2000), construct validity can be supported by using three 
approaches: multiple data collection, multiple sources to identify a proposition, and getting feedback 
from a key informant. The primary data sources are collected via phone interviews. We interview 12 
employees of the focal company and 8 employees of Chinese suppliers (see first row in Table 1). All 
these employees are selected because they are directly impacted by the IOS and they use the IOS most 
frequently in their daily routines. Other information is gathered from firms’ official web-site and 
industry white paper. Table 1 also shows the frequencies of the presence of proposed factor items over 
all interview records where each item has at least one observation, further supporting construct 
validity. Moreover, all interviews are tape recorded and then transcribed into manuscripts before 
analysis. The manuscripts are reviewed by the Chief Technical Officer (CTO) of the focal company 
for getting feedback. 
External validity establishes the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized (Yin 2003). 
We use two approaches that are suggested in past literature: employing a case that can reflect general 
industrial situation (Yin 2003) and using participants’ own interpretations of events and processes 
(Cooper 2000). This case describes a general phenomenon in high-technology industry where the 
leading companies move their production line to China and these companies all face the issue of 
transferring information systems. In addition, the suppliers we select in this case are not dedicated to 
the focal company. Besides trading with the focal company, they also have business linkages with 
other Multi-National Enterprises (MNE) in the same industry sector. Through the interviews, they 
have mentioned that these MNE encounter similar problems when transferring their IOS to China.  
Reliability is demonstrated by the appropriate use of case study protocol in data collection phase (Yin, 
1994). We conduct telephone interviews from December 2005 to September 2006. Each interview is 
confined to one to two hours. Follow-up e-mail inquiries are conducted when necessary. According to 
the telephone interview guide suggested by Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999), extensive notes are taken 
during each telephone interview with a structured interview protocol designed beforehand to 
accommodate note taking. The notes are analyzed in terms of how it matches the identified items in 
our proposed framework. This allows several evidences from interview records to be identified 
associated with the four factors we have proposed (Table 1). Interviewers then forward these 
summaries to interviewees for comments and correction. The analyses presented below are formulated 
from the summarized data.  
 
Table 1. Sources of Information and Frequencies of Observations for Propositions
 Focal Company (Computers Inc.) Chinese Suppliers (S1~S7)  









S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
  
Factors Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total  Sum 
Tangible assets 
specificity 
13 11 13 1 3 2 5 5 0 13 3 5 74 0 0 13 15 7 3 0 0 38 112 
Business process 
specificity 






5 21 10 6 5 1 5 15 21 10 8 14 121 6 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 12 133 
Factor total  18 49 35 16 13 13 23 31 21 44 29 33 325 19 21 32 33 35 15 3 1 159 484 
IOS knowledge 
sharing activities 




0 12 1 4 1 2 3 2 5 3 2 2 37 2 1 4 5 9 0 1 0 22 59 
Factor total  6 35 13 11 8 14 18 16 26 23 11 27 208 6 15 31 14 22 4 5 7 104 312 
Strategic 
complementarity 
10 11 31 17 3 5 12 3 6 7 7 10 122 14 15 10 13 8 3 4 4 71 193 IOS 
complementary 
resources  Organizational 
compatibility 
4 5 8 4 1 0 3 0 1 1 3 6 36 5 5 2 2 4 0 2 1 21 57 
Factor total  14 16 39 21 4 5 15 3 7 8 10 16 158 19 20 12 15 12 3 6 5 92 250 
SOP enforcement 0 16 16 7 5 3 8 5 1 21 14 17 113 9 6 16 4 8 9 0 3 55 168 
Performance 
management 
2 15 5 9 10 6 3 6 5 12 9 10 92 18 11 27 17 15 0 0 0 88 180 
Effective IOS 
governance 
Risk management 2 0 0 2 4 5 3 0 1 0 3 2 22 2 9 19 6 11 0 1 0 48 70 
Factor total  4 31 21 18 19 14 14 11 7 33 26 29 227 29 26 62 27 34 9 1 3 191 418 
Sum               918         546 1464 
4 CASE ANALYSIS 
Computers Inc.
1
 is one of main ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) companies which produce 
notebook, LCD monitor, PDA and phone in Taiwan IT industry. It was established in early 80’s. Head 
office is set in Taipei with two factories in China. Total annual revenue reaches more than NT7,000 
billion dollars with worldwide workforce over 20,000 in 2005. In recent years, Computers Inc. has 
moved its production line to China to maintain a cost advantage. With tighter linkage and increasing 
demand for purchasing activities conducted in China, the company request their Chinese suppliers to 
adopt a specific e-procurement system (EP) to facilitate communication and integration between both 
parties. In 2004, over 500 Chinese suppliers of company A have used this EP to receive orders. 
This EP is part of the “Demonstration Project” sponsored by the Taiwanese MOEA (Ministry f 
Economic Affairs) with the purpose of initiating a strong and agile e-procurement network between 
first-tier Taiwanese ODMs and their second-tier suppliers. Fifteen ODMs are selected to participate in 
this project, and Computers Inc. is one of them. In 2001, this project has successfully linked more than 
1,800 Taiwanese suppliers into this integrated network. Via the system, monthly forecast is sent to 
suppliers for preparing the production. According to the forecast, purchase order (PO) request is 
automatically generated and sent to suppliers in a week notice, including detailed product information 
and order amount. After suppliers confirm the PO, PO are automatically transformed into advanced 
shipping notices (ASN). Upon receiving the shipments, the buyers of Computers Inc. re-key the ASN 
into the ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system and then generate the invoices on a monthly 
basis.  
After successfully implementing this system in Taiwan, Computers Inc. transfer the entire EP to 
China. Up to the present time, there are around 500 Chinese suppliers who use this system to transact 
with Computers Inc. Despite the system’s wide adoption, the performance of this system in China is 
relatively unsatisfactory in terms of grant complaints from user sides. Eager to find the reasoning 
behind this, Computers Inc. partners with us to collect system usage experience from both buyer and 
seller sides and relate them to our proposed relational factors. The result can help us understand what 
aspects of these relational investments are not in place and how this contributes to a failed IOS transfer 
in the context of China.  
4.1 IOS-specific Investments 
There is a consensus that both Computers Inc. and suppliers should develop an IT infrastructure that 
tailors the EP needs. Users complain about the speed of connection. Every click to the next page needs 
about “three to five seconds, or even ten seconds” [Taiwan Buyer], making order placement a lengthy 
process, and “delaying the whole operating process up to one hour” [Supplier]. The unfriendly user 
interface worsens the situation. “The current EP only allows 10 items at most to be processed in a Web 
page, but one PO usually includes hundreds of items” [Supplier]. The system also does not support re-
do function, which creates a lot of frustration. Users need to check “hundreds of boxes to fulfill a PO” 
[Supplier]. Once they check a wrong box, they need to start again from the beginning. In addition, the 
shortage of dedicated human resources for managing this EP reduces the usage of the system. Since 
Computers Inc. does not set an IT department in China, any IT-related question is forward to Taiwan 
for solution, which consumes a lot of time. Many Chinese users therefore prefer to “go back to 
traditional way (e.g. phones and emails) to process orders when any system problem comes up” 
[Chinese buyers].   
                                              
1 This is not the organization’s real name. I thank the management and employees at Computers Inc. for allowing me to 
interview them and their Chinese suppliers. 
In addition, “the system doesn’t fully support the procurement process in China” [Senior IT Manager]. 
Due to the volatile demand, Chinese suppliers are often required to fulfill orders in an urgent manner. 
Since the current system does not provide real-time ordering information, these urgent orders usually 
“do not go through the system but through manual ways such as phone and fax” [Chinese Buyer]. 
Furthermore, since theses urgent orders are not shown in the system in real time, they can not 
transform to ASN automatically, and therefore they are usually delivered without ASN. After the 
delivery, suppliers need to “manually key-in these ASN just for the purpose of documentation” 
[Suppliers]. The real benefits of ASN are missing. Lack of domain knowledge makes the situation 
worse. Since the China department is newly established, Chinese buyers “don’t have much experience 
in operations and the system” [Taiwan Buyer]. The lack of experience makes them “incapable to 
prevail on suppliers how to use the system” [Taiwan Buyer]. In addition, “the high turnover rate of 
employees in China obstructs the knowledge accumulation” [Chinese Buyer]. The insufficient 
knowledge disables them to use the system properly. Besides, the lack of understanding partnering 
suppliers also causes problems. “Because Chinese buyers are not familiar with their suppliers, 
communication problems may exist” [Taiwan Buyer]. Since procurement decisions are made by 
sourcers in Taiwan, Chinese buyers are often not well informed of the most recent decisions due to the 
geographical distances, which easily cause misunderstanding when these buyers communicate with 
suppliers. 
4.2 IOS Knowledge Sharing 
The ineffective knowledge transfer mechanisms among users reduce the system performance. For 
example, due to cost concern, the training of the EP is outsourced to a Taiwanese IT service company. 
This IT service company only offers regular training sessions in Taiwan, and therefore “Chinese users 
need to find out their own way to learn the EP” [Senior IT Manager]. Typically, Chinese buyers learn 
the EP from their Taiwanese colleagues, who have taken the training courses as they come back 
Taiwan on business. When any new supplier connects with the system, three to four Taiwanese buyers 
are sent to offer its user representatives one to two-day on-site courses. These users are then 
responsible of teaching other colleagues in their own company. Such knowledge transfer process is 
problematic. First, due to significant growth and change at Computers Inc. Taiwanese buyers that are 
sent to teach Chinese buyers and suppliers are “either new to the company or new to the areas they are 
representing” [Chinese Buyer]. “They also have little knowledge of doing business in China” 
[Suppliers]. Since these trainers have difficulties to articulate why activities are being done, users can 
hardly consent to any fundamental changes to their procedures and work processes due to the use of 
the system. The second problem results from the lack of dedicated IT team for answering requests for 
help. The high turnover rate means that when a user encounters a system problem, it is very possible 
that he/she can not find the original trainer for assistance. Many Chinese suppliers complain that they 
“do not know whom to report the system problem and ask for help” [Suppliers]. For Chinese buyers, 
the requests for assistance often take a convoluted route. They report their problems to their supervised 
Taiwanese sourcer, who then transfers the problem to the outsourced Taiwanese IT service centre.  
Such indirect connection for assistance lengthens the required time for problem solving. “It takes at 
least two days for having somebody replying my request” (Chinese buyer). Because the problem often 
can not be solved within the users’ cycle time, the users tend to solve the problems on their own and 
arbitrarily decide when the problem is big enough to warrant a call for help.  Problems mount up and 
are neither shared nor resolved companywide.  
4.3 IOS Complementary Resources 
One of the important strategic IOS complementary resources is users’ perception of IOS benefits. 
Since all of the suppliers understand well that the EP has become the only channel for Computers Inc. 
to place orders, and “they can not get any orders if they refuse to use the system” [IT Manager]. The 
EP therefore becomes a strategic necessity rather than just a strategic benefit. Although the coercive 
adoption of the EP increases the system usage rate, many user representatives do not think the current 
EP brings much convenience to their daily operation. Some suppliers complain about the system’s 
inability to handle product returns and others struggle with inaccurate and inconsistent order 
information. In addition, the current EP only automates the order requisition process, which is 
relatively a minor aspect of the procurement problems that companies face. Procurement is a closed-
loop process that begins with the product requisition and ends once the invoice for the product is paid. 
The current EP however does not leverage any existing complementary system such as warehouse 
management systems, quality control, and accounts receivable to facilitate the entire purchasing cycle, 
and nor do its suppliers have the capability to develop these complementary systems. Besides, Chinese 
firms do not have processes and cultures that are compatible enough to realize the strategic benefits of 
IOS. “We find Chinese users are relatively conservative” in terms of a general cautious stance toward 
adopting new procedures and systems [Taiwan Buyer]. Any action should be based on “what they 
have been told by upper management”, which reduces the potential to explore new and effective 
pathways of doing things through the EP [IT Manager].   
4.4 IOS Governance 
Ineffective IOS governance reduces the willingness of Chinese users to use the EP. For example, 
suppliers need to take responsibility of any loss of shipments even the loss may due to the mistakes 
made by the warehouse of Computers Inc. Since the current EP does not integrate with warehouse 
management systems, whenever the loss occurs, suppliers “have no way to track what happens and 
complaints seem to be made in vain” [Chinese Supplier]. In addition, the EP does not have any 
mechanism to control the potential opportunism that comes in different forms such as arbitrary 
changes in predefined volume allocation, last-minute order changes or cancellations, or mishandling of 
suppliers’ shipments. Such opportunistic behavior creates a great deal of tension between Computers 
Inc. and its suppliers. Some big Chinese suppliers start to interact with customers directly. They 
bypass the ODM and directly ship high-priced, customized parts to the customers so they can “trace 
the items more easily without interference from Computers Inc., even though Computers Inc. have 
asked them to deliver those parts via its own hub” [Chinese Supplier].  
Moreover, although Computers Inc. forces Chinese buyers and suppliers to process all orders through 
this EP, the company does not provide any incentive for obeying this rule or punishment for violation. 
Chinese users are rewarded based on their job performance, with no obvious incentives for using the 
system, and therefore many users prefer the old ways of doing things (i.e. processing orders through 
phone calls and emails), because “the communication is more direct and timely through the traditional 
way” [Chinese Buyer]. Furthermore, though the system is initiated by the senior vice president in 
procurement, the whole system is developed by Taiwanese IT department. Many times when IT staff 
makes suggestion to promote the system usage, Chinese user representative veto the suggestion 
because they think the system is originated for meeting the needs of Taiwanese users, not Chinese and 
the vetoes are agreed by upper management and thereby the suggestion is overturned [IT Manager].   
4.5 Summary 
Table 1 shows frequencies of the presence of four propsed relational factors over all interview records. 
From the total number of items, each factor’s items’ relative frequencies are the following: IOS-
specific invetstment items 33.1%; IOS knowledge sharing items 21.3%; IOS complementary resource 
items 17.1%; and IOS governance items 28.5%. Overall the IOS-specfic investment and IOS 
governance-related items play the most significant role in IOS transfer in China (Figure 2). We next 
investigate which items are the most important in IOS transfer. This is carried out by analysing the 
frequencies of each item and identifying items in each fctor whose relative frequency is over 30%. The 
most common items are: (1) business process specificity; (2) dedicated knowledge sharing activities; 
(3) strategic complementarity; (4) SOP enforcement; and (5) performance management. The result 
shows that the most effective way to transfer IOS to China can be explained by the following logic. 
The company should first divide the current processes conducted with Chinese partners into clearly 
understood activities and precisely specify the output requirements for each activity. Then, the 
company needs to customize its IOS to align with the requirements of each acitivty. Second, the 
company has to prepare training sessions and system guidance document for new and old users and 
designate a specific team to help system transfer. This team is assigned dedicated job responsibility for 
problem solving, so for each task users clearly know whom to report the problem. Third, it is 
important for users to perceive system benefits, so they are more willing to spend efforts and time to 
learn the system. Often users are more easy to realize the benefits if the system in use can complement 
with other existing systems to bring new organizational capabilities. Finally, it is necessary for the 
company to design effective governance mechanisms that can provide enough incentives for users to 
follow system requirements, monitor the data use, control data accuracy and ensure all data sent by the 













Figure 2. Relative frequencies of research items 
5 CONCLUSION 
The proposed framework has discussed four potential relational factors that may affect the transfer of 
IOS to China. Computers Inc., a major Taiwanese PC ODM, is chosen to test the proposed framework. 
Through the case study, we find IOS-specific investment and effective governance are identified as the 
most important relational factors whereas IOS complementary resource has least effect. The fact that 
governance factors are significant to IOS transfer may result from suppliers’ weak market power in 
China. In this case, suppliers are forced to adopt the IOS provided by Computers Inc. They do not 
have choices if they want to make business with Computers Inc. In the condition that suppliers are not 
perfectly happy to adopt the IOS, they only concern how well the system can support their business 
operations. Furthermore, suppliers may perceive more benefits if the IOS allows them to monitor and 
control the status of transactions and track buyers’ payments. Losing such system capability is thus 
considered as a risky implementation from supplier perspective. That is, suppliers may feel strongly 
unsecured if the system does not provide any function to prevent buyers’ opportunistic behavior. On 
the other hand, IOS complementary resources factor has extremely little effect on IOS transfer in this 
case. Perhaps it is because the IOS complementary resource is a relatively strategic consideration that 
is less considered by Chinese supply chain players while they usually spend most of time dealing with 
operation issues. The result may suggest that Chinese players should extend their current operation-
oriented IOS development to a more strategic level. Moreover, a low investment in IOS-specific assets 
in China in terms of supportive technological and managerial infrastructure, processes, and knowledge 
has made IOS transfer a daunting job. The result surfaces Chinese firms’ little knowledge about BPR. 
Finally, the case study conducted here provides an interpretation of a single IOS transfer project in an 
organization. Although significant insight can be gained from such interpretation, further investigation 
of the proposed framework in other cases should be pursued to enhance the generality of research 
findings. 
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